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1. Introduction
When you think about textbooks that provide 
“an introduction to political philosophy,” what do 
you imagine? It may, for example, summarize the 
contents of great works from ancient Greece and 
Rome to major contemporary political thinkers, and 
introduce them chronologically. It may be a textbook 
based on the methodology of “history of thought.” It 
seems that such textbooks are relatively widespread. 
In recent years, however, the number of textbooks 
that summarize and introduce views of political 
philosophers on various modern-day issues such as 
war, terrorism, poverty, environmental problems, 
human rights protection, multiculturalism, nation-
alism, immigration, refugees, etc., has increased. 
Textbooks such as these are said to be oriented 
toward “problem-solving.” Some of these textbooks 
may focus on the development of contemporary 
political philosophy—especially after John Rawls’s 
“revival” of political philosophy.
However, let us imagine the questions beginners 
of political philosophy are concerned with in the first 
place. They might not have any doubt about details 
of the discourses of specific thinkers or solutions to 
specific problems; rather, they might be concerned 
with the question “What is political philosophy?” 
or “What does it mean to do political philosophy?” 
But indeed, adequate answers for these fundamental 
questions have been given in neither “history-
oriented” textbooks nor problem-solving-oriented 
ones. The American philosopher, Robert Talisse’s 
Engaging Political Philosophy is a remarkable text-
book because it does not take either a historical or a 
“problem-solving” approach. Rather, it leaves readers 
thinking “What is political philosophy after all?”1
2. The Structure of the Book and a Brief 
Overview of the Contents
First, I introduce the rough structure of the book 
as follows and make a brief overview of the contents.
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Part I comprises chapters 1 and 2 outlines the 
premise of the book. It explains the discipline of 
political philosophy, discusses what it means to do 
political philosophy, and clarifies the book’s method-
ology.
We are born into the world as a “social existence.” 
In other words, the social institutions surrounding 
us play a major role in defining who we are. Among 
such institutions, what is particularly important for 
us is the “state.” Therefore, one of the main subjects 
of political philosophy is concerned with the state. In 
particular, it is an attempt to clarify, from a norma-
tive point of view, why the state exists. In contem-
porary Western societies, the existence of the state 
is generally justified in light of the idea of “liberal 
democracy.” Consequently, a normative justification 
of the state is inseparable from an interpretation of 
liberal democracy.
Then, in Par t I I (chapters 3 to 6), Talisse 
examines four basic concepts constituting liberal 
democracy. On the one hand, liberal democracy 
fundamentally commits to the view that each person 
is treated as free and equal, while on the other, 
according to the famous formulation by the soci-
ologist Max Weber, the state claims a legitimate 
monopoly of violence. Therefore, the state is trying 
to impose legitimately some restrictions on each of 
us. If so, such a state is incompatible with the idea of 
a free and equal individual. This provokes an impor-
tant question: Why can free and equal individuals 
justify the state that tries to constrain their liberty 
and even coerce their subordination? In other words, 
“Why not anarchism?”
Therefore, in chapter 3, Talisse at first considers 
about how liberty should be interpreted. According 
to him, there are three major philosophical accounts 
of liberty: a negative conception, a positive concep-
tion, and a civic standing conception of liberty. 
However, because any of these conceptions is insuf-
ficient, he argues that a “hybrid” interpretation might 
be preferred in which liberty is the absence of inter-
ference among autonomous social equals.
In order to comprehend the conception of liberty, 
it is essential to interpret the ideas of autonomy and 
equality. In other words, the various fundamental 
concepts that constitute liberal democracy are not 
separate and isolated ones; rather, they are deeply 
related to each other. Consequently, it is crucial to 
show their consistent interpretation, which is one of 
the main purposes of this book.
Given the “hybrid” interpretation of liberty, how 
can it be compatible with the authority of the state? 
This is the main theme of chapter 4. Put differently, 
what conditions must be met in order for the state 
to have authority over the lives of its citizens (that 
is, on what grounds are we as citizens obliged to 
obey the state and its orders?)? In truth, it is not so 
easy to explain why you have a duty to subordinate 
your own will to the state’s authority. Thus, there 
is a point made in philosophical anarchists’ argu-
ments that no state can claim legitimate authority. 
So, Talisse suggests the idea of “deflated authority.” 
It is, in a sense, a conditional authority. It means 
that people have a prima facie duty to obey the state, 
which is reasonably just and sufficiently democratic. 
Then, to understand the concept of authority clearly, 
it is important to grasp the concepts of justice and 
democracy appropriately.
Chapter 5 is devoted to a consideration on the 
concept of justice. Justice involves the core of the 
liberal commitment to the equal concern of indi-
viduals. The ways that individuals interpret equality 
and consider how to allocate goods and opportunities 
out of this liberal commitment is directly related to 
the extent that people have liberty. It is especially 
important to distribute the resources that are neces-
sary for democratic citizenship equally because the 
question of how we can authorize and justify the 
state is inseparable from an interpretation of democ-
racy. Consequently, at present, it might be said that 
justice prevails when materials and social resources 
necessary for participation in democracy are distrib-
uted equally. The question that needs to be answered, 
however, is “What is democracy?”
Democracy is a complex concept, but according 
to Talisse, by understanding the function of democ-
racy as “public reasoning” based on citizens’ delib-
erations, citizens can justify the state’s actions and 
have reasonable grounds for the authority of the 
state. However, it is difficult to conceive of every 
citizen engaging in public deliberation about social 
and political matters. Therefore, Talisse proposes a 
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“contestatory” version of deliberative democracy. 
This is a model of democracy in which legislators 
and public officials are required to establish laws 
and policies based on their deliberation whereas citi-
zens are required effectively to be social critics who 
call for their governments to account for whether 
their laws and policies are justifiable with “public 
reasons.”
For Talisse, by giving an internally consistent 
interpretation of the conception of liberty, authority, 
equality, and democracy in this way, it is possible to 
explain the legitimacy of the state from a viewpoint 
of liberal democracy.
3. Brief Comments
If you read this book, you can understand 
that political philosophy, as Talisse presents it, is 
“engaging,” but what is “engaging” in this book? In 
my view, it is the methodology. According to Talisse, 
there is no neutral philosophical thinking. Of course, 
we should try to think philosophically from a neutral 
point of view as much as possible, but it cannot be 
completely neutral, because our thinking is greatly 
influenced by the culture, tradition, and customs of 
the community in which we live. Rather, we should 
be conscious of that, and consequently, we should be 
able critically to examine the communities that have 
nurtured us. For Talisse, this is to “think philosophi-
cally.” Therefore, he intends to explore a normative 
justification of the state in relation to a possibly 
consistent interpretation of the dominant political 
ideal in his society—“liberal democracy.”
Although Talisse’s methodology is an impor-
tant attraction of this book, it also highlights one of 
book’s limitations. This is because the arguments 
developed throughout the book are based on a 
specific cultural context—that of American society. 
Given this, it might seem a bit of an unfamiliar argu-
ment to make for people in other societies, especially 
in non-Western societies.
For example, the latter half of Chapter 6 refers 
to “deliberative democracy.” In fact, some theorists 
often argue that democracy has reached a “deliberative 
turn.”2 It is surely reasonable not only that the act of 
voting underlies the representative system but also 
that “deliberation” in civil society is increasingly 
important. I agree with Talisse’s proposal for a modi-
fied conception of deliberative democracy, because 
as he argues public deliberation is, in a sense, bit 
demanding for citizens (pp. 151-153). However, what 
I want to point out is that at the root of the idea of 
deliberative democracy lies an implied “idea of self” 
that thinks rationally and articulates his or her opin-
ions properly. In my view, such an idea of the self 
is definitely familiar within Western societies but 
would be different from the idea of the self that has 
been cultivated, for example, in the Japanese cultural 
tradition in which I was raised.3
That does not mean that the idea of “deliberation” 
itself is unfamiliar in Japanese society. As Amartya 
Sen argues, a tradition of “deliberation” is not an 
exclusive feature of Western society but can be found 
in many non-Western societies. In the case of Japan, 
for example, there is an interesting glimpse of the 
idea of “deliberation” in “The Seventeen-Article 
Constitution” created in early seventh century 
by a person considered to be Prince Shotoku, for 
example.4 If so, a conception of deliberative democ-
racy that can be found in the Japanese cultural tradi-
tion might be slightly different from the conception 
practiced in Western liberal democracies.
Therefore, in my view, it seems that Talisse’s 
book should have contained some normative consid-
erations of “nationality.” To be sure, thinking 
about “the state” is to interpret a proper relation-
ship between the state and the core commitments 
of liberal democracy. However, especially in the 
modern world, the state is substantially a sovereign 
nation-state. Even if liberalism is based on individu-
alism (pp. 22-23), individuals understand a concep-
tion of liberal democracy in their cultural contexts, 
which are mainly national cultural contexts (even 
though each person would be separable from such 
2 See for example John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
3 According to Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, whereas the idea of an “independent self” is dominant in Western societies, especially in the 
United States, the idea of an “interdependent self” has prevailed in East Asian societies. See Hazel Rose Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, “Culture 
and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion and Motivation,” in Psychological Review, vol. 98, no. 2, pp. 224-253, 1991.
4 See Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture And Identity, London: Penguin Books, 2005. However, of 
course, “The Seventeen-Article Constitution” is not a modern constitution; therefore, it does not define the appropriate relationship between state 
and the citizens but rather indicates some kinds of virtues that political elites should acquire.
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contexts). Then, to be precise, it seems necessary to 
ask from a normative point of view how to interpret 
the relationship between the state, an ideal of liberal 
democracy, and nationality.
However, Talisse is well aware of this limitation 
of his book. That is why he emphasizes the impor-
tance of “doing political philosophy.” Here we should 
remember the concept / conception distinction as 
mentioned in this book (pp. 43-45).5 A “concept” of 
liberal democracy is different from a “conception” 
of liberal democracy. No one would deny that both 
Japan and the United States are committed to liberal 
democratic values. However, the notion that both 
societies share the same “conception” of political 
society is suspect. Rather, it seems natural to me 
that different societies and cultures have different 
“conceptions” of liberal democracy.6
Talisse’s great accomplishments in his Engaging 
Political Philosophy are his articulation of what it 
means to be “doing political philosophy” and then his 
explanation of what it means to “do political philos-
ophy” in the American cultural contexts in which he 
in fact lives. In response to this, the readers, in turn, 
must “do political philosophy” by starting within 
their own cultural contexts. In my way of saying, we 
must examine what kind of a conception of “liberal 
democracy” is derived from the cultural traditions 
to which we belong by using a “folkloristic” and 
“anthropological” method. By doing so, you will be 
able to compete rival “conceptions” derived from 
the same “concept,” which leads to the cultivation 
of each “conception.”7 From this point of view, as 
Talisse says, this book is not an “introduction” to 
political philosophy but rather an excellent “primer” 
to it. I hope that Talisse’s readers will become 
“engaged” in the world of political philosophy.
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Princeton University Press, 2000 and Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context, Princeton: Princeton University 
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